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Ozonoff v. Berzak: Loyalty Screening Program for
United States Applicants for World Health
Organization Employment Violates
First Amendment
Since 1953 U.S. citizens seeking work with the United Nations or
the World Health Organization (WHO)' have been subject to loyalty
investigations under Executive Order Number 10422 (the Order) 2 as
a condition of employment. In Ozonoff v. Berzak 3 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Order was overbroad as applied to
prospective WHO employees.
The Order requires the Secretary of State to forward the names
of U.S. applicants for permanent jobs with covered international or-
ganizations to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for a Na-
tional Agency Check of FBI, OPM, Military Intelligence, and other
investigative and intelligence agency files. 4 If this investigation
I The World Health Organization, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, was es-
tablished in 1946 by intergovernmental agreement. It provides a wide variety of health-
related services in member nations throughout the world. See generally 17 Y.B. OF INT'L
ORGS. A3548g (1978).
2 Exec. Order No. 10422, 3 C.F.R. 921 (1949-53 Comp.), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 10459, 3 C.F.R. 945 (1949-53 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 10763, 3 C.F.R. 411 (1954-58
Comp.); Exec. Order No. 11890, 3 C.F.R. 1064 (1971-75 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 12107,
3 C.F.R. 264 (1978 Comp.), reprinted as amended in 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Order]. The Order covers employees of the United Nations and other public interna-
tional organizations that enter into loyalty screening agreements with the United States.
See Order, supra, at Part I para. 1, Part III. President Truman issued the Order in response
to a report by a commission of international jurists appointed by the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral following federal grand jury and Senate Internal Subcommittee investigations of U.S.
citizens in the U.N. Secretariat. See Note, Subversives in the UN: The IVorld Organization as an
Employer, 5 STAN. L. REv. 769, 780-81 (1953); 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 60-1 (1953). The
Order was designed to ensure that "Americans who are Communists or are under Com-
munist discipline" are not employed by the United Nations or other international organi-
zations. 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 58 (1953). Prior to its adoption the State Department and
the Secretary-General used a secret agreement to prevent U.N. employment of "disloyal
Americans." Id. at 58, 60. Under this arrangement the State Department sent any adverse
comments deemed appropriate about a prospective employee's loyalty to the United
States to the Secretary-General by word of mouth after making a national agency check.
The Secretary-General did not receive the information on which the adverse comments
were based. Id. at 60. Although the Secretary-General is solely responsible for hiring and
firing U.N. employees, he has agreed that the U.N. should not employ persons who have
engaged or might engage in subversive activities against the host government. See id. at
58-61; Note, supra, at 770-79.
3 744 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1984) (unanimous three-judge court).
4 Order, supra note 2, at Part I paras. I, 3(a).
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reveals "derogatory information" about an applicant, the FBI con-
ducts a full field investigation. 5 "Derogatory information" includes a
wide range of activities and associations, including "treason or sedi-
tion or advocacy thereof" and "advocacy of revolution or force or
violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United
States."' 6 The full field investigation report is forwarded through the
OPM to the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board
(the Board),7 which conducts an inquiry" and submits to the Secre-
tary of State an advisory opinion as to "whether or not on all the
evidence there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person
involved to the Government of the United States." 9 The Secretary
of State sends the opinion to the appropriate official in the interna-
tional organization for use in making an employment decision.' 0
The court of appeals found that Dr. David Ozonoff, a former
temporary WHO employee seeking a permanent position with the
organization, had standing to challenge the Order on first amend-
ment overbreadth grounds. Dr. Ozonoff suffered an actual injury, as
required for standing under article III, because the threat of investi-
gation under the Order had a "chilling effect" on his speech and
associational activities." The court reasoned that a person genu-
inely interested in WHO employment would believe it necessary to
refrain from acting in ways deemed disloyal under the Order, so as
not to threaten his or her opportunity for employment.' 2 It cited a
number of Supreme Court cases 13 supporting the proposition that
"if the plaintiff's interest in getting or keeping ajob is real, the likely
'chilling effect' of an apparent speech-related job qualification con-
stitutes a real injury."' 14
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified the standing
requirements imposed by the case or controversy clause of article III
of the Constitution in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
5 Id. at Part I para. 4.
6 Id. at Part II para. 2(b)-(c).
7 Id. at Part I para. 5; see also id. at Part IV (structure and functions of Board).
8 See id. at Part I para. 5. The Board provides all persons whose cases it considers
with a written statement of the derogatory information, an opportunity to answer the state-
ment in writing, and an opportunity for an adversary hearing. See id. at Part IV para. 3.
1) See id. at Part I para. 5, Part II para. 1, Part IV paras. 2, 4. The Board, however,
may submit the derogatory information about the prospective employee to the Secretary
of State for transmission to the international organization in question at any time during
the investigation or Board proceeding. See id. at Part I para. 6.
lo See id. at Part I para. 5, Part IV para. 2.
1 1 See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 228-29.
t2" Id. at 228-30.
I't See id. at 228 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Law Students Civil
Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1971); Baggett v. Bul-
litt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 283-84
(1961).
14 zonoff, 744 F.2d at 228.
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for Separation of Church and State, Inc. 15 In Valley Forge a taxpayers'
organization was denied standing to challenge, under the first
amendment, a government transfer of surplus federal real property
to a private religious college. The Court held that
at an irreducible minimum, Article III requires the party who in-
vokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant" ... and that the injury "fairly can be
traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision." 
6
Although the relevant cases have not frequently dealt with the issue
in the standing context, the Court consistently has held that the Gov-
ernment directly harms a person when it conditions receipt of a ben-
efit "on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech,"' 7 even
though the person has no "right" to the benefit.' 8
Many of these cases have involved investigations or compelled
disclosures of the speech and associational activities of public em-
ployees, or of law students required to pass character examinations
by the state bar. In Baggett v. Bullitt, for example, the Court held a
state teacher loyalty oath unconstitutionally vague, noting that a
teacher could not be compelled to choose between risking a perjury
prosecution by taking the oath and losing his or her job by refusing
to take the oath. 19 The oath violated the first amendment because it
obliged teachers and public servants "to steer far wider of the unlaw-
ful zone ... by restricting their conduct to that which is unquestiona-
bly safe."'20 The Court used similar reasoning to invalidate a
complex plan for investigating and disqualifying teachers for disloy-
alty in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.2 1 It found that the plan was "a
highly efficient in terrorem mechanism" under which a teacher would
15 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
1( Id. at 472 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 41 (1976)).
17 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
I Id. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1469 (1968); but cf Milbrath, The Free Speech Rights of Public
Employees: Balancing with the Home Field Advantage, 20 IDAHo L. REV. 703, 729 (1984) (argu-
ing that recent decisions restricting public employees' right to criticize employers reassert
right-privilege distinction with regard to speech-related employment conditions).
The principle appears in many contexts. See, e.g., Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
(denying official campus recognition to student political group unconstitutional); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264-65 (1967) (criminal statute outlawing employment of
Communist Party members at defense plants unconstitutional); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11, 18-19 (1966) (state teacher loyalty oath unconstitutional); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964) (denying Communist Party members right to travel
abroad unconstitutional); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960) (compelling
teachers to disclose all associational ties unconstitutional); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525-26 (1958) (loyalty oath for state tax exemption applicants unconstitutional).
1,) 377 U.S. 360, 374 (1964).
20 Id. at 372.
21 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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"stay as far as possible from utterances or acts which might jeopard-
ize his living."' 22 The Court applied the same reasoning in Baird v.
State Bar,2 3 invalidating a bar examination inquiry into a candidate's
affiliations with subversive organizations. Noting that such inquiries
discourage the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, the
Court held that "whatever justification may be offered, a State may
not inquire about a man's views or associations solely for the pur-
pose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes. " 2 4
The Court thus has struck down government inquiries into a
person's loyalty as a precondition of public or private employment
because of their chilling effect on protected speech and conduct.
Nonetheless, the Court has held that allegations of a chilling effect
on first amendment activities arising from the mere existence of a
government data-gathering program will not confer article III stand-
ing. In Laird v. Tatum2 5 the Court held that plaintiffs had not shown
the requisite injury when their claims were based on bare knowledge
of an Army domestic surveillance program not aimed specifically at
them.2 6 The Court distinguished Laird from cases such as Baird,
Keyishian, and Baggett, in which the chilling effect arose from "regula-
tory, proscriptive, or compulsory" governmental acts to which "the
complainant was either presently or prospectively subject."' 27
The Ozonoff court found Laird inapposite, holding instead that
the Order created a chilling effect like that arising from the loyalty
oaths and investigations in Baird, Keyishian, and Baggett.28 Ozonoff's
22 Id. at 601.
23 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
24 Id. at 6-7.
25 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
26 See id. at 13-14.
27 Id. at I.
28 Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 229. Ozonoffdiffers from Baird, Kevishian, and Baggett insofar as
the latter cases dealt more clearly with facial overbreadth in the classic sense. Those deci-
sions turned on a generalized chilling effect which the challenged regulations could have
on the conduct of all persons subject to them, and not merely on that of the plaintiff. For a
discussion of the chilling effect doctrine in first amendment jurisprudence, see generally
Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendnent: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV.
685 (1978). The chilling effect theory has been criticized as an unsubstantiated empirical
claim. See Redish, The 1Ian'en Court, the Binger Court and the Fist Aiendnient Overbreadth Dor-
trine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031, 1040-41 (1983); but see Haiman, Conmnents on Martin Redish .1
The l'Harren Court, the Burger court and the First Anendmnent Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L..
REV. 1071, 1074 (1984). One commentator has argued that the chilling eflect theory need
not be based on empirical assumptions. Instead, he argues that the chilling effect doctrine
is, in eflect, a principle of comparative harm. An imperfect legal system, with its inherent
error and uncertainty, creates fear and deterrence by hypothesis, because human beings
are risk averse. Because the first amendment embodies preferred values, the threat of
deterrence of protected activity is by definition more harmful than the threat of first
amendment "overprotection, which also exists in an imperfect legal system. This is so
regardless of empirical claims about individuals' behaviors. See Schauer, supra, at 685-704.
730-31.
Personal investigations like those required by the Order divulge more information
than do oaths or compelled disclosures by a prospective employee, and thus "may have a
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application for WHO employment would not be processed without a
National Agency Check of a variety of investigative files. As a result,
he reasonably felt compelled to constrain his behavior so as not to
appear disloyal. He therefore suffered an injury sufficient to confer
standing, regardless of whether the FBI would conduct a full field
investigation, or whether he ultimately would be "cleared" or
hired. 29
The First Circuit declined to decide whether the President had
authority under the Constitution, absent congressional legislation, to
investigate the loyalty of U.S. citizens seeking work with international
organizations. 30 Instead, it held that the Order was overbroad be-
cause it was directed at political advocacy. 3 ' The Ozonoff court fo-
cused on the Order's investigative standards, which classified
evidence of "treason or sedition or advocacy thereof [and] advocacy
of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of
government of the United States" as derogatory information that
cast reasonable doubt on the loyalty of a U.S. applicant for employ-
ment with an international organization. 3 2 The court found that the
particularly substantial deterrent effect on the exercise of first amendment rights." Devel-
opments in the Law: The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130,
1182 (1972); cf. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 22-
23 (1964) (necessary investigational apparatus incompatible with a free society). The
threat of dissemination exacerbates this effect "as technology for storing, correlating, and
regurgitating information improves, and government inquisitiveness grows in geometric
progression." American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 421 v. Schlesinger, 443 F. Supp.
431,434 (D.D.C. 1978). See also Note, Governmental Investigations of the Exercise of First Amend-
ment Rights: Citizens' Rights and Remedies, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1257, 1264-65 (1976).
29 See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 227-30. The court nonetheless noted that Ozonoff was
particularly likely to forego legitimate utterances and acts because it virtually was certain
that the FBI would investigate him. "Derogatory information" about Ozonoff was appar-
ently on file with some investigative or intelligence agency because Ozonoff was the sub-
ject of a full-scale investigation in connection with his previous temporary WHO position.
See id. at 226-29.
3o Id. at 230. The Supreme Court has been extremely deferential to exercises of ex-
ecutive power in matters involving foreign policy. See Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026,
3039 (1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-62 (1981); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). It has held that when the Pres-
ident acts without express congressional authorization:
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on
'Executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II. Past practice does
not, by itself, create power, but long-continued practice, known to and acqui-
esced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been
taken in pursuance of its consent ....
Dames & .Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)). See also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). The Executive
Branch nevertheless is bound and limited by the first amendment. See l'alle.v Forge, 454
U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1967)
(merchant marine loyalty program exceeded congressional authorization and first amend-
ment limits).
:10i:onoff, 744 F.2d at 230.
32 Order, snpra note 2, at Part II para. 2(b)-(c); see Ozonq/f 744 F.2d at 230. See also
Order. supra note 2. at Part I para. 4.
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sweep and vagueness of these provisions deterred political speech,
and that this chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights
outweighed the Government's asserted interest in national security
and foreign policy. 3"
The court initially noted that the Government's power to limit
advocacy is circumscribed narrowly. It relied on Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 3 4 a challenge to a criminal statute in which the Supreme Court
held that "advocacy of the use of force or of law violation [may not
be proscribed] except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."'3 5 Similarly, the Ozonoff court found that the Govern-
ment's power to limit advocacy indirectly through speech-related
conditions on employment was constrained. 36 Employing reasoning
similar to that used to find that Ozonoff had suffered an actual injury
giving him standing to sue,3 7 the court held that the Order was over-
broad because it "aim[ed] directly at political advocacy."138
The Ozonoff court's analysis is consistent with pre- and post-Bran-
denburg Supreme Court decisions involving similar issues. In Healy v.
James the Court explicitly applied the Brandenburg standard to hold
unconstitutional a university's denial of official campus recognition
to a student group that allegedly advocated a "philosophy of disrup-
tion."'3 9 Prior to Brandenburg the Court in Keyishian had condemned
as unconstitutionally vague a teacher loyalty program that apparently
forbade the employment of persons who engaged in various kinds of
abstract advocacy. 40
Shortly after deciding Healy the Court limited the use of the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, upholding
a state statute that regulated state employees' political activities.
4 1 It
held that
facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional
rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the
State to sanction moves from "pure speech" toward conduct and
that conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise
valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests ...
[P]articularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we
33 See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 230-33.
34 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
35 Id. at 447-48.
36 See Ozonoff. 744 F.2d at 231-33.
37 See id. at 231, 233-34. The court relied on the kind of unconstitutional condi-
tions/chilling effect analysis discussed supro notes 13-24, 28-29 and accompanying text.
:4 Id. at 232.
39 403 U.S. 169, 187-92 (1972).
40 385 U.S. 589, 599-601 (1967).
41 413 U.S. 601 (1973). For analysis and criticism ofBroadrick and cases following it,
see generally Redish, supra note 28; Note, First Amendment Vagueness and OVerbreath: Theoreti-
cat Revisions by the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REv. 609 (1978). See also Schauer, supra note 28,
at 685-86 & n.8.
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believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legiti-
mate sweep. 4 2
Though the Ozonoff court failed to mention Broadrick in its over-
breadth analysis, Ozonoff is readily distinguishable from Broadrick and
its progeny. 4 3 In Ozonoff the challenged regulation was aimed di-
rectly at advocacy, which clearly is not "otherwise unprotected be-
havior" under the standard developed in Keyishian, Brandenburg, and
Healy.44 Although it has not addressed the advocacy issue, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the substantial overbreadth test is
inapplicable when the challenged statute is aimed directly at speech.
42 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. The speech-expressive conduct distinction has been
attacked as artificial, illogical and an inexplicable departure from prior case law. See Red-
ish, supra note 28, at 1058-61; Note, supra note 41, at 614-16. The Court apparently has
abandoned, or at least retreated from, the distinction in cases decided after Broadrick. See,
e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977); Erznoznik v. City
ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 206 (1975).
The point of the Broadrick substantiality requirement apparently is that "if the majority
of cases reached by the statute does not involve protected conduct, the statute's over-
breadth will not be deemed 'substantial,' even though it might be 'real.' " Redish, supra
note 28, at 1064; see also Note, supra note 41, at 616-17, 622-23. The substantiality test has
been criticized as creating an unworkable standard that leads to entirely subjective results.
See Note, supra note 41, at 616-17; but cf Redish, supra note 28, at 1064 (requirement stems
from Court's "apparent fascination with easily-applied 'code' words in overbreadth analy-
sis in lieu of a more sophisticated and open interest-balancing process"). One commenta-
tor has noted that "[tihere is no reason to assume that 'the extent of deterrence of
protected speech' somehow necessarily decreases in an absolute sense when the number
of instances of unprotected activity reached by the challenged statute increases, relative to
the number of protected instances." Redish, supra note 28, at 1065.
43 See cases cited supra note 42; infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. See also
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (upholding federal statute allowing discharge of
government workers "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" as not
reaching constitutionally protected speech); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (uphold-
ing military regulations forbidding "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" and
punishing willful disobedience).
44 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. It thus seems unlikely that the Order
could be sustained as not substantially overbroad even though it also classifies as "deroga-
tory information" evidence of activities such as espionage, sabotage, intentional and unau-
thorized disclosure of confidential U.S. information, and knowing membership in, with
specific intent to further the aims of, groups seeking to overthrow the Government by
illegal means. See Order, supra note 2, at Part II paras. (a), (d), (0.
The phrase "otherwise unprotected conduct" in Broadick may be a reference to the
traditional third-party standing rules used in facial overbreadth analysis. These rules per-
mitted a litigant to challenge a statute's facial validity even though his own conduct legiti-
mately could be regulated under a more narrowly drawn statute. See Redish, supra note 28,
at 238-29; Note, supra note 41, at 611 & n.7, 629-30. To the extent that Broadrick was
designed to limit the use of such third-party standing, it clearly should not control in O-o-
noff, where the plaintiff argued that the Order was overbroad as applied to him. It has
been argued, however, that "the overbreadth doctrine pertains exclusively to the question
of standing. If a party attacking a law or defending a prosecution has engaged in constitu-
tionally protected behavior the overbreadth doctrine serves no purpose." Schauer, supra
note 28, at 692 n.39. But see Redish, supra note 28, at 1042 (substantive inquiry of over-
breadth doctrine is whether challenged regulation "impedes first amendment rights more
than is necessary to achieve a legitimate goal;" therefore, doctrine is relevant where liti-
gant argues that his own conduct is protected by the first amendment).
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It held an ordinance prohibiting the use of "opprobrious language"
toward police officers overbroad in Lewis v. City of New Orleans45 with-
out mentioning Broadrick. Subsequently, in Bigelow v. Virginia4 6 the
Court invalidated a prohibition on advertisements for abortion serv-
ices, stating explicitly that the substantial overbreadth test was not
controlling.47 The Court also refused to apply the Broadrick analysis
in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,48 in which it
sustained a challenge to an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door
fundraising by charities that used less than seventy-five percent of
their receipts for charitable purposes.49
The Ozonoff court completed its overbreadth analysis by conclud-
ing that the Order violated the first amendment because it was aimed
at advocacy of revolution or sedition.50 Noting that "government
standards tending to inhibit speech must be clear and precise," 5' the
court found the Order's advocacy provisions irreconcilable with Bag-
gett52 and Keyishian.53 In Baggett the Supreme Court held that a loy-
alty oath that incorporated a definition of "subversive person" as
one who "advocates .. .any act intended to overthrow, destroy or
alter... the constitutional form of government.., by revolution" 5 4
was unconstitutionally vague. 55 Similarly, in Keyishian the Court in-
validated, on vagueness grounds, an employee loyalty program that
required a worker's removal for "treasonable or seditious utterances
or acts." 56 The statutes in question did not define the word "sedi-
tious" precisely 57 but indicated that the prohibition encompassed
the advocacy of sedition and thus had "virtually no limit." 58
While the Ozonoff court did not distinguish overbreadth from
vagueness,59 it found the overbreadth of the Order harmful because
45 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
4(i 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
47 See id. at 815-17.
48 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
49 See id. at 628-33.
50 Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 232.
51 Id. at 231.
52 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
53 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
54 Baggen, 377 U.S. at 362.
55 See id. at 366-68.
5(i Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 597.
57 See id. at 597-98.
58 Id. at 599.
5,) See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 232. "An overbroad statute encompasses constitutionally
protected conduct within its proscriptive sweep." Note, supra note 41, at 610. "[A statute
will be held void for vagueness when it 'either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.' " Id. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926)). The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines overlap. See NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) ("objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth" lies in
danger of regulations "susceptible of sweeping and improper application"). See also Note,
supra note 41, at 611, 626, 636.
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it chilled protected first amendment activity. 60 The Supreme Court
in Baggett and Keyishian used similar analyses to articulate the evils of
vagueness. 6 1
The Ozonoff court rejected the Government's proffered bases for
distinguishing the cases from earlier Supreme Court decisions which
invalidated employment conditions that infringed first amendment
freedoms. 62 It noted initially that despite "the President's unique
foreign policy role, the Executive still must bear some burden ofjus-
tification when depriving citizens of basic free speech and associa-
tional rights."'63 The court held that the Government had not met
this burden because it had failed to identify "any tangible harms that
might occur to United States security or foreign policy concerns" if
WHO employees were not subject to the investigative requirements
of the Order. 64 Because Ozonoff was a medical doctor who "did not
want to represent the United States abroad, engage in diplomacy, or
practice politics"' 65 and did not seek employment with the federal
government, 66 the court observed that the Order, as applied to
WHO job applicants, was unsupported by any significant govern-
mental interest. 67
The first amendment limits Executive as well as congressional
action. 68 While recognizing the Government's substantial interest in
ensuring the fitness of those who hold sensitive positions,69 even
though they are not government employees, 70 the Supreme Court
60 See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 231; see generally supra notes 11-14, 19-29 and accompanying
text.
61 See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603-04; Baggett, 377 U.S. at 372.
62 In addition to the arguments discussed infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text,
the Government pointed out that "[t]he Order says only that advocacy is a factor that 'may
be considered in connection with' a loyalty determination; and that the resultant determi-
nation is simply forwarded to WHO for its use." Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 233 (emphasis in
original). The court found the case indistinguishable from the loyalty oath cases because it
created an identical chilling effect. See id. at 233-34. It noted that the Order suggested no
narrower standards for determining loyalty, and that there was no evidence that interna-
tional organizations made hiring decisions contrary to loyalty appraisals under the Order.
See id.; see also supra note 2.
63 Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 233. Cf Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971) (State Bar
must show inquiry into associations "necessary to protect a legitimate state interest"); De
Gregory v. New Hampshire Att'y Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) (investigating citizen's
past subversive activities requires "overriding and compelling state interest"); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (same, with regard to
compelled disclosure of NAACP membership list); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees
Local 421 v. Schlesinger, 443 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1978) (similar reasoning used to invali-
date questionnaire regarding Department of Energy employees' associational activities).
64 Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 233.
65 Id. at 232-33.
66 Id. at 233.
67 See id.
68 See supra note 30.
69 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967) (teachers);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960) (same).
70 See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24-25 (1967) (merchant marines); United
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has held that "the purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."' 71 In Shelton v. Tucker the Court held that although teach-
ers occupied sensitive positions, the state could not compel them to
disclose all of their associational ties. 72 Similarly, in Baird it held that
a state could not inquire whether a bar applicant had belonged to an
organization that advocated overthrowing the government, 73 even
though limited inquiries into Communist Party membership could be
justified. 74 The factors that distinguish Ozonoff from Shelton and Baird
show that the cases are consistent in principle. Even assuming that
the Order is related to foreign policy and national security inter-
ests, 75 the investigations it requires are not limited to persons seek-
ing sensitive posts. It is the sensitivity of the jobs involved that
justifies some limited inquiries into the speech and associational ac-
tivities of certain employees; absent such sensitivity, Shelton and Baird
logically would foreclose sweeping inquiries of the kind invalidated
in Ozonoff.7 6
The Ozonoff court declined to narrow the language of the Order
through interpretation, 77 finding "no obvious or natural interpreta-
tion of 'advocacy' or 'sedition' that would render the Order constitu-
tional."178 Furthermore, neither the Order itself nor the Government
"provided any suggestions for a permissibly narrow reading."' 79 The
court's position is consistent with that taken by the Supreme Court in
Aptheker v. Secretary of State"0 and United States v. Robel.81 The Court
has imposed a limiting construction on some federal statutes to save
them from constitutional infirmity, 82 but not when doing so would
amount to rewriting a statute. In Aptheker the Court found that a stat-
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (defense plant employees); Koningsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (lawyers).
71 Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
72 See id.
73 See Baird, 401 U.S. at 6-7.
74 See id. at 9 (Stewart, J., concurring).
75 The justification for the Order, at least with regard to United Nations employees, is
to protect the United States, as host government, from subversive activities. See 28 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 60-61 (1953); supra note 2. Such reasoning does not necessarily extend to
WHO doctors living and working abroad.
76 Cf Developments, supra note 28, at 1174 ("The governmental interest in many loyalty
programs is . . . too insignificant to justify any substantial chilling effect on speech or
association [w]here nonsensitive positions are involved"). See also United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967) (challenged statute barring employment of Communist Party
members in defense facilities did not distinguish sensitive and nonsensitive jobs).
77 See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 234.
78 Id.
79 Id., see also id. at 233.
80 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
81 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
82 See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. at 24-26 (statute authorizing President "to
'safeguard' vessels from 'sabotage or other subversive acts' " did not authorize exhaustive
merchant marine loyalty screening program). See also Note, supra note 41, at 624.
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ute prohibiting overseas travel by Communist Party members could
not be narrowed "without substantial rewriting."'8 3 The Court in
Robel refused to attempt to narrow a statute that prohibited the em-
ployment of Communist Party members in defense plants. 84
Ozonoff probably will have little immediate effect on Government
loyalty screening programs based on legitimate foreign policy and
national security interests. The First Circuit invalidated Executive
Order Number 10422 only as applied to applicants for nonsensitive
WHO positions. 85 Although the court's overbreadth analysis could
be applied equally well to hold that the Order has an impermissible
chilling effect on the speech and associational activities of U.S. appli-
cants for employment with the United Nations, the decision leaves
open to the Government at least some opportunity in future cases to
articulate compelling reasons for continuing to apply the Order to
such applicants. 8 6
The Ozonoff court's rather novel approach to the chilling effect
theory may have a significant impact on future challenges to over-
broad statutes, particularly those involving domestic surveillance or
investigations of citizens' speech and associational activities. The de-
cision clearly establishes that the chilling effect analysis appropriately
may be applied to a litigant's own first amendment activities as well
as those of third parties also subject to the challenged regulation. 7
Further, the reasonable person standard that the court used to vali-
date Dr. Ozonoff's claim that the Order deterred him from engaging
in protected activities 8 distinguishes the individual chilling effect
analysis from the "mere subjective allegations" that the Supreme
Court found wanting in Laird.89 Ozonoff thus provides a means for
litigants to overcome the barriers to overbreadth challenges raised
by Broadrick and its progeny. 90 The Ozonoff individual chilling effect
analysis allows a party to apply the constitutional standards devel-
oped in cases dealing with facially vague or overbroad statutes to
show that his own speech and associational activities have been cur-
tailed, thereby avoiding the difficulties involved in establishing third-
83 Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 515.
84 Robel, 389 U.S. at 262.
85 See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 225.
86 The court recognized the President's enhanced authority in matters related to for-
eign policy. See id. at 232-33; see generally supra note 30. The court held that such authority
alone was insufficient when the Government presented no specific foreign policy or na-
tional security concerns to justify the Order. The Government might at least attempt to do
so with respect to prospective United Nations employees. See supra note 75. The Order,
however, was not based originally on any "evidence justifying a conclusion that there was
spying or espionage on the part of American citizens employed in the United Nations." 28
DEP'T STATE BULL. 58 (1953). See also supra note 2.
87 See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 227-39.
88 See id. at 230, 234.
89 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
90 See generally supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
1986]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
party standing and substantial overbreadth. 9 1
The Ozonoff court's individual overbreadth analysis is perceptive
and potentially groundbreaking. The First Circuit analyzed a variety
of cases and articulated a central theme in first amendment jurispru-
dence developed in an era characterized by increasing governmental
control over daily life coupled with greater governmental power to
monitor the individual citizen's activities. It applied its analysis to a
unique fact pattern to reach a compelling result. The court's failure
to realize fully the implications of its analysis was, perhaps, its major
shortcoming. Because the individual chilling effect does not raise
third-party standing issues, the court might have dispensed with a
good deal of its detailed explication of the rules of standing.92 Fur-
ther, the court would have added force to its overbreadth analysis of
the Order's advocacy provisions had it referred to the Broadrick sub-
stantial overbreadth theory and explained why that theory was not
controlling. Its failure to do so is not fatal, however, because the
court showed clearly that the advocacy provisions fell squarely within
the prohibitions on governmental action developed in a long line of
Supreme Court cases.
JANE FRIEDENSEN
91 See id.
92 See Ozonoff, 744 F.2d at 227-30; supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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